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It is always difficult to draw the line in determining whether the 
government is interfering with the freedom of religion. On July 9, 2021, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals made a difficult decision. The 
majority opinion supported a religious organization’s right to raise a 
ministerial exception as an affirmative defense against its employee’s 
hostile work environment claim. This article explains my disagreement 
with the majority opinion.  
 
The ministerial exception is derived from the freedom of religion 
principle. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”1 From the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
flows the ministerial exception, which “ensures that the authority to select 
and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly 
ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.”2  
 
The plaintiff, Demkovich, was a minister in a Catholic Church.3 Reverend 
Dada made belittling, humiliating, and derogatory comments against the 
plaintiff and later fired the plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit had a de novo 
review. The Seventh Circuit first concluded two principles from two 
important cases that applied the ministerial exception, Hosanna-Tabor and 
Our Lady of Guadalupe. First, the rationale from the cases involved was that 
allegations of discrimination in termination can be expanded. The 
protected interest of a religious organization in its ministers covers the 
entire employment relationship, including hiring, firing, and supervising 
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012). 
3 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., No. 19-2142, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at 
*972, *973 (7th Cir. July 9, 2021). 
    




in between.4 Second, the ministerial exception prevents civil intrusion and 
excessive entanglement.5 The court then considered Demkovich’s hostile 
work environment claims.6  
 
1. Incorrect application of Hosanna-Tabor. 
 
The Supreme Court has not decided on whether the ministerial exception 
bars lawsuits other than those regarding the firing of a minister.7 The 
Supreme Court case of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC was about an employment 
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her 
church’s decision to fire her.8 But in Demkovich, the hostile work 
environment claim is based on the fact that Reverend Dada repeatedly 
subjected the plaintiff to derogatory comments and demeaning epithets 
showing a discriminatory animus toward his sexual orientation and 
involved not only the firing but also the interaction between the plaintiff 
and the Reverend Dada. Firing a minister is different from verbally 
abusing the minister. Therefore, the application of the ministerial 
exception here is not a requirement.  
 
The Seventh Circuit applied Hosanna because it believed that what 
Reverend Dada did was supervising9 the plaintiff and allowing the 
plaintiff’s hostile work environment suit due to such supervision will 
intrude upon the freedom of religion. However, supervision, even within 
a religious organization, cannot avoid the courts’ regulation if criminal or 
personal tort liability is involved. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
 
4 Id. at 976–77.; See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 194–96. 
5 See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060–61, 2069 (2020); 
Hosanna–Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187–89. 
6 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *977. To succeed on a hostile work 
environment claim, Demkovich must show: (1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a 
protected characteristic; (3) that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of 
employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) a basis for 
employer liability. 
7 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
8 Id. 
9 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *979. 
    




Reverend Dada had the freedom to supervise the plaintiff because the 
freedom of religion includes the freedom among the entire employment 
relationship, including hiring, firing, and supervising in between.10 
However, there is a precondition that the supervision should not violate 
neutral, generally applicable standards that would be enforceable on 
behalf of a non-ministerial employee.11 The majority admitted that no 
court has held that the ministerial exception protects against criminal or 
personal tort liability.12 
 
Moreover, Reverend’s Dada’s verbal abuse is tortious harassment instead 
of appropriate supervision. Here, it seems that the majority’s opinion 
allows the church’s supervision to be exercised by repeatedly making 
discriminatory comments against the plaintiff since it ruled that what 
Reverend Dada did is supervision. The definition of supervision is lacking 
in the majority’s opinion. The majority simply held that it is not the court’s 
job to decide the scope of supervision.13 But why can the court interfere 
when criminal or tortious conduct is involved? The court will still look 
into the nature of the alleged conduct instead of avoiding all inquiries at 
the beginning of a suit. As the dissenting opinion explained, the Supreme 
Court noted that a hostile work environment is not a permissible means of 
exerting control over employees and accomplishing the mission of the 
religious organization.14 The conduct plaintiff alleged here is classic 
tortious harassment.15 
 
2. Allowing hostile work environment claims will not intrude upon the 
freedom of religion.  
 
a. No religious organization’s internal doctrine is involved.  
 
 
10 See id.; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 194–96. 
11 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *994 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. at 982. 
13 Id. at 979. 
14 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
15 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *991 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
    




The circuit here supported its argument that a religious organization 
should be free to decide how to lead the organization based on the 
reasoning from Hosanna that a religious organization “must be free to 
choose those who will guide it on its way.”16 The reason Hosanna said this 
was because the fact was about the firing of a minister and the reason to 
fire the minister was her violation of the Lutheran doctrine. The doctrine 
is that disputes should be resolved internally.17 Here, Demkovish’s claim 
was about the hostile work environment created by the derogatory 
comments against the plaintiff made by Reverend Dada and such 
comment had no discernible connection with the terms of his 
employment18 nor the faith or doctrine. Unlike Hosanna, where the 
church’s internal doctrine was involved, the church here did not even 
raise any religious doctrine to justify the Reverend’s behavior. 
 
b. Making the belittling and humiliating comments is not a matter of faith 
and doctrine.  
 
The Seventh Circuit said that allowing the plaintiff’s claim would harm a 
church’s independent authority in matters of faith and doctrine,19 and 
Reverend Dada’s supervision of Demkovish is such a matter.20 A church’s 
independence on matters of faith and doctrine requires the authority to 
select, supervise, and remove a minister without interference by secular 
authorities.21 The function of such independence is letting a “wayward 
minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling not contradict the church’s 
tenets” and not “lead the congregation away from the faith.”22 But the 
belittling and humiliating comments made by Reverend Dada were not 
preaching, teaching, nor counseling but simply expressing his personal 
opinion against his coworker during the work. Such judgment does not 
 
16 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
17 Id. at 205. 
18 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *973. 
19 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2055. 
20 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *979. 
21 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060. 
22 Id. 
    




require the court to investigate the organization’s internal doctrine nor 
faith. The church should bear the burden to prove that making such 
comments derives from its doctrine or faith. 
 
c. The court’s concern of excessive state entanglement has no basis.  
 
The Seventh Circuit feared that allowing Demkovich’s claim without 
ministerial exception makes “every step” that the church took in internally 
responding to the behavior of Reverend Dada legally relevant.23 The 
assumption was raised from the dissenting opinion of a Ninth Circuit case 
involving a female minister having a sexual harassment claim against a 
church, a presbytery, and her supervisor24. However, there is no evidence 
that suggests that the court will need to inquire about the church’s 
internal doctrine or faith. 
 
Asking the religious organization to disclose the communication between 
the ministers is not asking them to follow the government’s lead to 
supervise the organization. Thus, a showing is absent that the 
circumstances of Demkovich’s case will require excessive entanglement 
between civil and religious realms.25 
 
d. The significance of a minister’s legal status will not be demeaned by a 
secular standard asking a minister not to make belittling nor humiliating 
comments upon others during the work.  
 
The Seventh Circuit here emphasized a minister’s legal status and 
reasoned that such status’ significance let the religious organization be 
free to decide how to lead the organization.26 The members of a religious 
group put their faith in the hands of their ministers.27 Actually, 
supervision based on inappropriate verbal bullying will derogate from the 
 
23 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *983. 
24 Id. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004). 
25 Demkovich, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20410, at *994 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. at 978. 
27 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
    




significance of a minister’s status and from the significance of its function 
as a “lifeblood” and “backbone” between a church and minister. In this 
case, Reverend Dada is more likely tearing down, instead of building, the 
congregation.  
 
The ministerial exception should not cover the hostile work environment 
claim because it does not require the court to investigate the religious 
doctrine, and humiliation is not a part of supervision that a legal 
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